Answer First
Primary Text
COMMERCIAL LAWS SUPPLEMENT
In determining the control of an entity, the Commission
may consider the following:
(a) Control is presumed to exist when the parent owns
directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries, more than one
half (1/2) of the voting power of an entity, unless in
exceptional
circumstances,
it
can
clearly
be
demonstrated that such ownership does not constitute
control.
(b) Control also exists even when an entity owns one half
(1/2) or less of the voting power of another entity when:
(1) There is power over more than one half (1/2) of the
voting rights by virtue of an agreement with investors;
(2) There is power to direct or govern the financial and
operating
policies
of
the
entity
under a statute or
agreement;
(3) There is power to appoint or remove the majority of
the members of the board of directors or equivalent
governing body;
(4) There is power to cast the majority votes at meetings
of the board of directors or equivalent governing body;
(5) There exists ownership over or the right to use all or a
significant part of the assets of the entity; or
(6) There exist rights or contracts which confer decisive
influence on the decisions of the entity.
RULE 7 Determination of Anti-Competitive
Agreement or Conduct
SECTION
1.
Determination
of
an
Anti-Competitive
Agreement or Conduct. —
In determining whether an anti-competitive agreement
or conduct substantially prevents, restricts, or lessens
competition, the Commission, in appropriate cases, shall,
inter alia :
(a) Define the relevant market allegedly affected by the
anti-competitive agreement or conduct, following the
principles laid out in Section 24 of the Act and Rule 5 of
these Rules;
(b) Determine if there is actual or potential adverse
impact on competition in the relevant market caused by
the alleged agreement or conduct, and if such impact is
substantial
and
outweighs
the
actual
or
potential
efficiency
gains
that
result
from the agreement or
conduct;
(c)
Adopt
a
broad
and
forward-looking
perspective,
recognizing future market developments, any overriding
need
to
make
the
goods
or
services
available
to
consumers, the requirements of large investments in
infrastructure, the requirements of law, and the need of
our economy to respond to international competition, but
also taking account of past behavior of the parties
involved and prevailing market conditions;
(d) Balance the need to ensure that competition is not
prevented or substantially restricted and the risk that
competition
efficiency,
productivity,
innovation,
or
development of priority areas or industries in the general
interest of the country may be deterred by overzealous or
undue intervention; and
(e) Assess the totality of evidence on whether it is more
likely
than
not
that
the
entity
has
engaged
in
anti-competitive
agreement
or
conduct,
including
whether the entity's conduct was done with a reasonable
commercial purpose, such as but not limited to, phasing
out of a product or closure of a business, or as a
reasonable commercial response to the market entry or
conduct of a competitor.
RULE 8 Determination of Dominance
SECTION 1. Existence of Dominance. —
Dominance can exist on the part of one entity (single
dominance)
or
of
two
or
more
entities
(collective
dominance).
SECTION 2. Assessment of Dominance. —
In determining whether an entity has a market dominant
position for purposes of this Act and these Rules, the
Commission shall consider the following illustrative and
non-exhaustive criteria, as may be appropriate:
(a) The share of the entity in the relevant market and the
ability of the entity to fix prices unilaterally or to restrict
supply in the relevant market;
(b) The share of other market participants in the relevant
market;
(c) The existence of barriers to entry and the elements
which could foreseeably alter both the said barriers and
the supply from competitors;
(d) The existence and power of its competitors;
(e) The credible threat of future expansion by its actual
competitors or entry by potential competitors (expansion
and entry);
(f) Market exit of actual competitors;
(g)
The
bargaining
strength
of
its
customers
(countervailing power);
(h) The possibility of access by its competitors or other
entities to its sources of inputs;
(i) The power of its customers to switch to other goods or
services;
(j) Its recent conduct;
(k) Its ownership, possession or control of infrastructure
which are not easily duplicated;
(l) Its technological advantages or superiority, compared
to other competitors;
(m) Its easy or privileged access to capital markets or
financial resources;
(n) Its economies of scale and of scope;
(o) Its vertical integration; and
(p) The existence of a highly developed distribution and
sales network.
SECTION 3. Presumption of Dominance. —
There
shall
be a rebuttable presumption of market
dominant position if the market share of an entity in the
relevant market is at least fifty percent (50%), unless a
new
market
share
threshold
is
determined
by
the
Commission for that particular sector.
SECTION 4. Setting the Thresholds for Dominance. —
The Commission shall, from time to time, determine and
publish
the
threshold
for dominant position or the
minimum level of share in the relevant market that could
give rise to a presumption of dominant position. In such a
determination, the Commission would consider:
(a) The structure of the relevant market;
(b) The degree of integration;
(c) Access to end-users;
(d) Technology and financial resources; and
(e) Other factors affecting the control of a market, as
provided in Section 2 of this Rule.
SECTION 5. Exceptions. —
The
Commission
shall
not
consider
the
acquisition,
maintenance
and increase of market share through
legitimate means that does not substantially prevent,
restrict, or lessen competition in the market, such as but
not limited to, having superior skills, rendering superior
© Compiled by RGL
46 of 203
Use With Care
Definitions and exceptions often appear before or after this text.
Court decisions may interpret, limit, or apply this provision.
Confirm amendment, repeal, effectivity, and official publication.